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Abstract
We derive a set of optimal environmental regulations in the presence of asymmetric information about pollution
abatement costs, where compliance may have to be induced through appropriate monitoring and enforcement
measures. The regulator commits to monitoring of compliance with incentive compatible environmental
regulations. The regulator can reveal regulations to achieve the objective of choosing the given  abatement level,
by proposing a menu of regulatory contracts that specify abatement levels.
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References1. Introduction
In the regulatory setting, it seems quite reasonable to presume that firms have  better
information about their productive capabilities and abatement opportunities than does the
regulator. In the model of environmental regulation with asymmetric information to follow,
the regulator anticipates the strategic response of a firm possessing full information about the
cost of pollution abatement. In this model, it is assumed that the regulator can make a
commitment to an incentive schedule from which the firm chooses a pollution abatement level
and receives a corresponding subsidy (penalty). Formally, the regulator's problem can be
represented as a direct revelation game in which the regulator commits to an incentive
schedule assigning abatement responsibility and the level of subsidy to the firm on the basis of
a subsequent message sent by the firm to the regulator about its abatement cost . The regulator
may restrict attention to incentive schedules that are incentive compatible. This class of
regulatory mechanisms induce the firm to truthfully reveal the value of its abatement costs.
Some papers in the optimal mechanism design literature analyze the potential benefit of
monitoring or auditing when designing regulatory contracts, but none of these papers address
the enforcement problem so critical to environmental regulation (Baron, 1989). For example,
in Baron and Besanko (1984), ex post auditing of firm costs may occur after output is
produced and, hence, after the firm has announced its costs. If the audit signal a misreport,
then the agent is penalized. The ability to monitor improves upon the Baron-Myerson (1982)
contract by reducing the firm's rent from private information and by increasing the efficiency
of the contract by allowing the regulator to set prices closer to marginal costs. This form of
auditing for cost-type is obviously different than monitoring for compliance with
environmental standards.
As we showed in the case-based context of hazardous waste management (Gottinger, 1999)
the essential elements of our analysis must include optimal, if costly and imperfect,
monitoring and enforcement of regulations, criminal behavior, and most importantly the
incentives for such behavior.
Our model is in the spirit of Swierzbinski’s model  (Swierzbinsky, 1994) though more
simplified and transparent, and it carries one important additional feature. It considers the case
of an option to the firm of noncompliance, covering a ‚criminal behavior‘ aspect not known to
the regulator. Also unlike suggested in a similar model of regulation by Jebjerg and Lando
(1997) the marginal incentives necessary to effectively abate pollution may not vary
according to firms‘ cost-types.
The paper is organized in the following manner. In Section 2 we provide the basic model
design and notation. In Section 3 we analyze incentive compatible environmental regulations
with costly monitoring and enforcement. Here we consider the possibility of corner solutions
regarding monitoring probabilites and contrast the resulting distortions in the standard setting
with the case of an interior solution for monitoring probabilities. Section 4 concludes this
paper.2
2. Structural Assumptions and Model Design
We start formulating the regulatory problem in a familiar conventional framework
(Besanko and Sappington, 1987). Suppose that the firm to be regulated is one of two possible
types. The types are distinguished by the cost of complying with a regulation that mandates
the quantity, q, of pollution that must be abated. Let C(q,q) represent the firm's total pollution
abatement cost . The parameter q summarizes the firm's cost-type, and its value is known by
the firm and unknown to the regulator.  We assume that to the regulator qe {q1,q 2 }with q2 > 
q1 . The regulator's prior belief that q = qi, for i e {1,2}, is described by ai e(0,1) such that a1
+ a2 = 1.
C (q,q) is meant to include all of the abatement costs the firm incurs in meeting a standard
of  q. It certainly includes the cost of installing and operating pollution abatement technology,
and it also includes lost profits due to any other changes in the production process (e.g.,
changes in output level or input mix).We make the following assumptions regarding C( q,q):
C( q,q)> 0 for all q > 0. (2.1)
       Cq(q,q)> 0 for all  q >0. (2.2)
       C(q,q 2) > C(q,q 1) for all q > 0, q2 > q1, and (2.3)
        Cq (q,q 2) >Cq (q,q 1) for all q > 0, q2 > q1 .  (2.4)
Also convexity on C applies.
Assumptions (2.1) and (2.2) state that abatement costs are positive and an increasing
function of q. Assumptions (2.3) and (2.4) identify the role played by the abatement cost
function parameter q. Assumption (2.3) suggests that total pollution abatement costs are
higher the larger is q, and assumption (2.4) suggests that marginal pollution abatement costs
are an increasing function of q as well. Thus, if the firm is a high- cost type, we mean that it
has higher total and marginal costs of pollution abatement than a low- cost type, holding
constant the level of pollution abatement q.
In the regulatory game developed here, the regulator offers a menu of contracts to the firm
from which the firm chooses one. Each contract is a quadruple, specifying a required level of
pollution abatement, qi , a corresponding lump-sum subsidy (penalty) to be paid to(by) the
firm, Si , a probability of inspection for compliance, pi and  a corresponding fine, Fi to be paid
by the firm if inspected and found to be out of compliance with the abatement standard qi.
With only two possible abatement cost-types, the firm is presented a choice between contract3
(q1,S1, p1 ,F1) and ( q2, S 2, p2,F2). More generally, with n possible cost-types, the firm is
presented with a choice of n regulatory contracts
1.
The timing of the regulatory game is as follows. First, the regulator offers the firm the
choice between ( q1,S1,p1,F1,) and ( q2 ,S2 ,p2, F2). Next, the firm chooses a contract, receives
the appropriate subsidy, and engages in production and pollution abatement activity. The
regulator cannot costlessly observe (non)compliance with the appropriate abatement standard.
Instead, the regulator monitors firm compliance with the probability, pi, specified in the
contract selected by the firm. An important feature of this design is that we assume the
regulator, through allocation of its monitoring and enforcement  budget, credibly commits to
the specified monitoring probabilities. This is done exogenously by the regulator, his
committing to probabilities depends on his assessment of the likelihood of non-compliance by
the firms and consequential damage. Probabilities will be high if the risk of non-compliance is
high and low otherwise. If monitoring occurs, we assume the inspection is perfectly
informative; monitoring reveals compliance or noncompliance without error. If a firm is not
complying with the abatement standard specified in her regulatory contract  (i.e., q < qi), the
firm pays the specified fine Fi.
In our model, the regulator anticipates the strategic response of a firm that knows about her
cost of pollution abatement. When designing the contracts (q1,S1, p1, F1) and ( q2,S2 ,p2 ,F2)
the regulator commits to an incentive scheme for the firm which is, in the terminology of
mechanism design, incentive compatible. The firm selects the contract designed for its
abatement cost-type. A low -cost type firm with q = qi will find it at least as profitable to
choose (q1, S1, p1, F1) as to choose(q2, S2, p2 ,F2). Similarly, a high- cost type firm will choose
(q2, S2, p2 ,F2) over (q1, S1, p1, F1) because its profits are maximized by that choice. Formally,
the regulator's problem can be represented as a direct revelation game in which the regulator
commits to an incentive schedule assigning abatement responsibility, lump-sum transfer,
monitoring probability, and fine for non-compliance on the basis of a subsequent message
sent by the firm to the regulator about its abatement cost function. The regulator may restrict
attention to  schedules which are incentive compatible and that induces the firm to truthfully
reveal  her abatement cost function parameter q.
Firm profits before environmental regulation are common knowledge and are equal to p.
Profits after regulation, for a firm complying with the abatement standard qi, are
P (p,qi, Si, q) = p - C(qi,q )+ Si, where q is the value of the firm's abatement cost function
parameter. When the firm is presented with two contracts (q1, S1, p1, F1) and  (q2, S2, p2 ,F2),
incentive compability requires that, for i, j e  {1,2}
P ( p, qi, Si; qi) ³  P (p, qj, Sj; qi). (2.5)
1 If  q is from a continuous interval such that q e { q ,q }, then the firm is presented with a regulatory schedule
(q(q), S(q), p(q), F(q)) from which a particular contract is calculated based upon the firm's revelation of q.4
These incentive compatibility constraints may be rewritten as
          - C( qi, qi) + Si  ³ - C (qj, qi) + Sj . (2.6)
Throughout the analysis to follow, we assume that the firm selects the regulatory contract
according to the regulator's preferences if it is indifferent about alternative contract.
Subsidies play a key role in maintaining incentive compatibility. Assuming that
compliance is induced with the abatement standards  q1 and q2, a firm with low abatement
costs  (i.e. q = q1) will only accept an abatement responsibility of q1 instead of q2,where q1 >
q2, if S1 > S2.  We also consider the economic cost of a subsidy S, as (b - 1)S. The parameter b
is greater than or equal to one, and it represents the administrative costs, tax distortions, or
other inefficiencies associated with the use of subsidies as an environmental policy
instrument. That is, every dollar paid to the firm in the form of a subsidy is provided at an
economic cost of b dollars.
To induce firm compliance with the standards, the regulator must choose the probabilities
of monitoring, p1 and p2, as well as the fines for noncompliance, F1 and F2 , appropriately.We
assume that the regulator will commit to monitoring with any probability so that random
monitoring will be his best choice, if as we assume the fines and subsidies are exogenously
given. To that end, we assume the regulator is subject to four sets of constraints. First, we
assume there is a maximum fine, ) which can be levied  against a noncompliant firm. To
regulators (from environmental protection agencies) in charge of enforcement, the maximum
penalties for violation are exogenously given.
The second set of enforcement constraints are the compliance constraints. Since the
regulator commits to the monitoring probabilities p1 and p2 , it is optimal to guarantee that the
firm (which has chosen the contract designed for her abatement cost-type) will comply with
the abatement standard rather than risk the punishment for noncompliance
2. We assume the
monitoring technology is without error and the probabilities of monitoring and fines for
noncompliance are independent of the size of the violation with the abatement standard:
therefore, if a firm decides to not comply with the standard , it will, in fact, not abate any
pollution. A noncompliant  firm's expected profits, if it chooses the contract designed for its
cost type, will be p + Si - pi Fi .The firm's profits, if it complies, will be p - C(qi , qi) + Si.
Throughout the paper, we assume that firms are risk-neutral. Consequently, the compliance
constraints may be written as
C(qi , qi)  £ pi Fi for i  e {1,2} (2.7)
In other words, a firm will choose to comply with an abatement standard if the cost of
compliance is less than the expected penalty for noncompliance.
2  In a model of enforcement without commitment to monitoring probabilities,it can be optimal to allow firms
to pursue a mixed strategy in which firms do not comply part of the time.5
The third set of enforcement constraints to the regulator's problem are hybrid constraints.
They are a combination of incentive compatibility and compliance constraints. The regulator
must ensure that the firm chooses and complies with the contract designed for its abatement
cost-type rather than choose and not comply with the terms of the contract designed for the
other cost-type. Profits for a compliant firm choosing the appropriate regulatory contract are
p - C(qi , qi) + Si while the expected profits for a noncompliant firm choosing the contract
designed for the other cost-type will be p - pj Fj + Sj . The hybrid constraints may be written
as
- C(qi , qi) + Si  ³ - pj Fj + Sj for i, j e  {1,2}, i ¹ j (2.8)
The hybrid constraint will prove to be binding for a high cost-type firm who may be
tempted to accept the contract designed for a low cost-type in order to obtain the relatively
large subsidy S1.
The fourth and final set of enforcement constraints is simply the requirement that p1 and p2
be less than or equal to one since they represent monitoring probabilities. In examining the
optimal incentive compatible environmental regulations with costly monitoring, we pay
careful attention to the case where one or both monitoring probabilities are optimally set to
their corner solution values of one.
To complete the model, we let the environmental benefits of pollution abatement be given
by the function E(q). As is standard in the environmental economics literature, environmental
benefits are assumed to be an increasing but concave function of pollution abatement
(i.e., E' (q) > 0 and E" (q) £ 0). For convenience, we assume that the expected cost of
monitoring for compliance is given by cp where c is the unit cost of monitoring and p is the
probability of a monitoring inspection. We assume that the regulator is risk-neutral; therefore,
the regulator is assumed to maximize the expected environmental benefit of abatement, less
the expected cost of abatement, less the economic cost of raising and administering the
expected subsidy, and less the expected cost of monitoring.
The regulator's problem is to choose ( q1, S1, p1, F1) and (q2, S2, p2, F2) to maximize
ai {E(qi) - C(qi,qi) - (b-1)Si - cpi} s.t.
p - C (qi,qi) + Si ³ 0, for i e (1,2) (2.9)
- C(qi,qi)+ Si ³ - C(qj,qi) + Sj, for i,j  e (1,2) (2.10)
C(qi,qi) £ piFi,  for    i e (1,2) (2.11)
- C(qi,qi) + Si ³ -pjFj + Sj, for i, j e (1,2) (2.12)
Fi £ F, for   i e (1,2) and
(2.13)
pi £ 1, for   i e (1,2) (2.14)6
Recall that ai represents the regulator's prior belief that q = qi. The inequalities of (2.9) are
individual rationality constraints, and they ensure that the firm enjoys a profit at least equal to
its reservation level: in this model, reservation profits are zero. The individual rationality
constraints guarantee that the firm will participate in the regulatory relationship. The incentive
compatibility constraints of (2.10) identify ( qi, Si, pi, Fi) as the regulatory contract the
compliant firm will choose when its abatement cost function parameter is qi.. Constraints
(2.11) through (2.14) are the aforementioned enforcement constraints.: the compliance
constraints, the hybrid incentive compatibility/compliance constraints, the maximum fine
constraints, and the monitoring probability constraints.
In subsequent propositions about optimal environmental regulations with costly monitoring
for compliance, we find that the maximum penalty constraint is binding; that is, F = F. In this
model, the firm is risk-neutral. When deciding whether to comply with an abatement standard,
the firm weighs the cost of abatement against the expected cost of noncompliance, pF. The
firm is concerned with the magnitude of the product pF, not its individual components p and
F. In this model, increasing the probability of monitoring is costly while increasing the
penalty for noncompliance is not. The regulator would ideally impose infinite fines and
monitor the firm with infinitesimal probabilities; however, for economic and political reasons
previously discussed, we rule this possibility out. Consequently, the regulator uses the
maximum fine possible, and  monitors the firm with a frequency large enough to maintain
compliance with the standard. Given that F is set to its maximum value ), binding compliance
constraints and costly monitoring results in abatement standards which are less stringent than
they would otherwise be.
3. Enforcement Model
In this section, we consider standard setting and enforcement issues jointly, and we
formally analyze the complete regulatory model.
Formally, the regulator's problem may be represented by the following Lagrangian, and the
regulator chooses (q1,S1,p1,F1) and (q2,S2,p2,F2) as well as l1,l 2,w 12 ,w 21, y1,y2, z12, z21, x1, x2,  
u1 and u2 to maximize.
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In this formulation of the regulator's problem, li, wij, yi,zij, xi, and ui,  for i, j, e {1,2}, i ¹ j,
are the nonnegative multipliers associated with the individual rationality, incentive
compatibility, compliance, hybrid incentive compatibility/compliance, maximum penalty, and
monitoring probability constraints, respectively. The regulator's problem can be simplified by
noting that some of the constraints are redundant: they are implied by pairs of other
constraints.
For instance, it can easily be shown that z12 = 0; the hybrid incentive compatibility/
compliance constraint is not binding for a low cost-type firm. Incentive compatibility requires
that
p - C (q1,q 1 ) + S1 ³ p- C(q2,q 1) + S2,
and assumption (2.3) states that
p - C (q2,q 1 ) + S2 ³ p - C (q2,q 2) + S2 since q2>q1 .
Finally, the compliance constraint for a high-cost type firm requires that
p - C (q2,q 2) + S2 ³ p - p2 F2 + S2,
and by transitivity
p - C (q1,q 1 ) + S1 ³ p  - p2 F2 + S2 : z12 = 0.
If incentive compatibility and compliance constraints are satisfied for low and high cost-
type firms respectively, the hybrid incentive compatibility/compliance constraint for a low
cost-type firm will be automatically satisfied.
Similarly, the compliance constraint for a low cost-type firm is redundant. Satisfaction of
the constraints of incentive compatibility for a low cost-type firm and hybrid incentive
compatibility/compliance for a high cost-type firm guarantee that y1= 0. Since
p - C (q1,q1 ) + S1 ³ p - C (q2,q 1 ) + S2 ³ p - C (q2,q 2 ) + S2 ³ p - p1 F1 + S1,
then
p - C (q1,q 1 ) + S1 ³ p - p1 F1 + S1.
Likewise, individual rationality for a low cost-type firm is guaranteed by satisfaction of the
constraints of incentive compatibility for a low cost-type and individual rationality for a high
cost-type. With p - C (q1,q 1 ) + S1 ³ p - C (q2,q 1 ) + S2 ³ p - C (q2,q 2 ) + S2 ³ 0, we have
p - C (q1,q 1 ) + S1 ³ 0, that is l1= 0.
We first look at the interior solution of the problem before we get to the corner solution.8
Proposition 3.1
The interior solution (i.e. p1, p2 e(0,1)) to the asymmetric information/enforcement problem
satisfies
(i)  E'(q1) = {b + c/F} Cq(q1,q 1 )





[ b - 1) + c/F]{Cq(q2,q2) - Cq(q2,q1}),
(iii)  S1= C(q1,q1) - C(q2, q1) + S2.
(iv)  S2= C(q2,q2) - p .
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The proof is given in the appendix.
One of the more interesting features of the optimal regulations is characterized by
condition (v) of Proposition 3.1. The probability of monitoring a low- cost type firm, p1, is set
at a level to satisfy the binding hybrid incentive compatibility/compliance constraint for a high
cost-type firm. Condition (v) may be rewritten as -C (q2,q2) + S2 = p1 ) + S1. The probability
p1 is chosen to deter a high- cost type firm from selecting the low cost-type regulatory
contract (and then not complying with the abatement requirement contained therein).
Condition (v) may also be expressed as p1) = C (a1,q1) +{ C (q2,q2) - C (q2,q1)}, and in this
firm, two points emerge. First, since {C (q2,q2)-C (q2,q1)} > 0, we know that  p1) > C (q1,q1).
The probability of monitoring , p1, is set to a level which is higher than necessary to induce
the low cost-type firm to comply with its abatement standard q1; the compliance constraint is
not binding for the low cost-type. The added complication of asymmetric information forces
monitoring probabilities to play a more complicated role in the optimal regulatory scheme. In
the case of asymmetric information, the monitoring probability p1 must also help maintain
incentive compatibility since noncompliance with regulations is a distinct possibility.
Second , since p1) = C (q1,q1) +{ C (q2,q2) - C (q2,q1)}, we also know that the regulator
commits to inspecting the low cost-type firm with greater frequency the larger its abatement
requirement q1; however, once again , this is true because the regulator must deter the high
cost firm from accepting the low cost contract and cheating. It is the hybrid incentive
compatibility/compliance constraint for a high cost-type firm which is binding, not the
compliance constraint for a low cost-type firm: z12 > 0 and y1 = 0. The cost of monitoring for9
compliance simultaneously influences both the optimal probabilities of monitoring and the
optimal pollution abatement standards.
Conditions (i) and (iii) of Proposition 3.1 characterize the abatement standard and subsidy
designed for the low cost-type firm. Condition (iii) implies that incentive compatibility is
binding for a low cost firm: S1 is chosen to make the firm indifferent between complying with
the low or high cost-type regulatory contracts. This result is well known in the incentive
literature relating to problems of adverse selection, and condition (iii) suggests that the result
continues to hold in a regulatory context of asymmetric information in which compliance
must be enforced through costly inspections. Condition (i) indicates that the abatement
standard for a low cost-type firm is distorted downward from the level which equates the
marginal benefit and cost of pollution abatement. If q1 were increased from the level described
by condition (i) of the proposition, S1 would have to be increased to maintain incentive
compatibility for a low cost firm. Increasing S1 in this manner would be unacceptably costly.
First, there are the direct welfare costs of raising, through distortionary means, the subsidy,
summarized by the parameter b. Second, increasing S1 to support an increase in q1 above the
optimal level described in condition (i) necessitates an increase in p1 to maintain satisfaction
of the hybrid incentive compatibility/compliance constraint for a high cost-type firm. For
every dollar S1 is increased p1 must be increased by 1/) at a unit cost of c. This accounts for
the c/) term in condition (i).
As condition (ii) of Proposition 3.1 makes clear, the presence of asymmetric information
about abatement costs heavily distorts the abatement standard to be met by a high cost-type
firm, particularly in a model complicated by costly monitoring for compliance. Since { Cq (q2,
q2) - Cq (q2,q1)} > 0, we know that q2 is chosen to be far below the level which would equate
the marginal benefit and cost of pollution abatement. Condition (ii) may be rewritten as
      a2[E’(q2) - Cq (q2,q2) - (b - 1) Cq (q2,q2) - c/) Cq (q2,q2) ]
       = a1 [b - 1) +c/)] {Cq (q2,q2) - Cq (q2,q1) }. (3.1)
In this form, equation (3.1) yields intuition about the standard setting process for a high
cost firm. From the regulator's perspective, q = q2  with probability a2. At the margin,
increasing q2 yields pollution abatement benefits of E'(q2) at a cost given by Cq (q2,q2).
Condition (iv) indicates that the individual rationality constraint is binding for a firm with q =
q2  . Consequently, if q2 is increased at the margin, S2 must be increased by Cq (q2,q2) at a
welfare cost of ( b - 1)Cq (q2,q2). Condition (vi) of Proposition 3.1 indicates that the
compliance constraint is also binding for a firm with q = q2, so p2 must be increased by
F
q Cq ) , ( 2 2 q
 at a unit cost of c if q2 is increased marginally. The left-hand side of equation (3.1)
captures the consequences of setting q2 when q = q2, and this occurs with probability a2 from
the regulator's perspective.
Moreover, setting q2 has implications for welfare even if q = q1, and the right-hand side of
equation (3.1) accounts for these effects. To the regulator q = q1 with probability a1 . If q2 is
increased at the margin, S2 must be increased as described in the preceding paragraph;10
however, S1 must also be increased to maintain incentive compatibility for a low cost-type
firm. S1 must be increased by Cq(q2,q1) becauseCq(q2,q2) is the amount S2 is increased and Cq
(q2,q1) is the amount abatement costs increase for a firm which accepts the (q2,S2,p2,  ))
contract, when q = q1. To keep a low cost-type firm from accepting the high cost-type
contract. S1 is increased at unit costs equal to [(b - 1) +c/)]. The (b- 1 ) term is the direct
welfare cost of raising the subsidy and the c/F  term relates to the cost of raising p1 to
maintain satisfaction of the binding hybrid incentive compatibility/compliance constraint for a
high cost-type firm when S1 is increased. Condition (ii) of Proposition 3.1 accounts for the
connection between the aspects of asymmetric information and costly enforcement so
prevalent in most problems of environmental regulation.
Now we move move to a special case of corner solutions.
If the cost of monitoring is relatively low, the benefit of pollution abatement relatively
high, the maximum penalty for noncompliance relatively low, it can be optimal for the
regulator to choose a corner solution for one or both monitoring probabilities. There are two
possible cases: (i) p1= 1, p2 < 1, and (ii) p1= p2 = 1. It can be shown that if p2 = 1, then p1= 1
as well. We will refer to the first case as a partial corner solution and the second case as a
complete corner solution. In the partial corner solution p1= 1, and the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the monitoring probability constraint u1 is positive.
Proposition 3.2
The partial corner solution to the asymmetric information/enforcement problem satisfies
(i)  E'(q1) = [b + 
F
c 1 1/a u +
]Cq (q1,q1),
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(v)  S1= C(q1,q1) - C(q2,q1) + S2.
(vi)  S2 = C(q2, q2) - p. And
(vii)  F1=  F2 = ) .11
The first three conditions of the proposition simultaneously solve for the optimal values of
q1,q2 and u1.Then conditions (iv), (vi), and (v) individually determine the optimal values of p2,
S2, and S1 respectively. In the partial corner solution, a margin for adjustment, p1 , is bound.
With p1 = 1, the standard setting process is affected dramatically by the hybrid incentive
compatibility/compliance constraint for the high cost-type firm. Increasing q1 or q2  requires
increasing S1 to maintain incentive compatibility for a low cost firm as before, but now
p1cannot be increased to maintain the hybrid constraint. The hybrid constraint must be
satisfied by altering q1,q2 or S2, which feeds back to the process of setting S1. Again,
conditions (i),(ii), and (iii) of the proposition must be solved simultaneously to determine the
optimal abatement standards in this partial corner solution case.
In the complete corner solution case, p1= p2 = 1, and the regulator enforces a pooling
equilibrium. If  ￿






, then  q1 =  q2 , S1= S2, and p1= p2 = 1.By contradiction,
suppose q1> q2 and S1 > S2. From the hybrid incentive compatibility/compliance constraint,
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 , but if p2 = 1 then ) = C(q2,q 2), and p1> 1 since by supposition
S1 = S2. This of course, violates the requirement that p1£ 1. In other words, if the regulator
finds it optimal to choose p2 = 1, then the regulator must also choose S1> S2. and q1 =q2.
However, the complete corner solution is not likely to prevail. It occurs only when the
maximum penalty for noncompliance, ), is so low that it is beneficial to set q2 so that
abatement costs are equal to ) even when q = q2. The compliance constraint, in concert with
the monitoring probability constraint, defines the maximum abatement standard that can be set
and enforced for a high cost-type firm. This is the level such that C(q2,q 2) = ). If the benefit
of pollution abatement is high enough to justify setting q2 to this level, the regulator cannot set
and enforce an even higher abatement requirement for a low cost-type firm. In this rare
instance, we are left with a pooling equilibrium in which q1=q2 and S1 = S2.
4. Summary and Conclusion
We have discussed the optimal design of incentive compatible environmental regulations
under conditions of asymmetric information about pollution abatement costs when
compliance with abatement standards can only be monitored at cost. Costly enforcement of
pollution standards is shown to distort downward the optimal level of abatement required of
both low and high cost firms. A hybrid incentive compatibility / compliance constraint is
developed and shown to be binding for high cost firms, thereby influencing the optimal values
of the regulatory variables.
This paper addresses the issues of asymmetric information and costly enforcement in a
united framework which, except für very recent research had not yet been explored in the
environmental economics literature. Much of the literature in environmental regulation has
treated the problems of asymmetric information and costly enforcement as distinct and
separate. The few papers which have explored the issues of standard setting and enforcement
jointly have restricted attention to suboptimal uniform standards.12
Much of the relevant work, (e.g.. Russell (1990) and Harrington (1988)), about the
strategic considerations of enforcing pollution control laws take as exogenously given a
uniform pollution control standard. In these papers, a repeated game framework is employed
to demonstrate that when regulating firms with heterogeneous abatement costs, enforcement
costs can be lowered by treating firms heterogeneously based upon their prior record of
(non)compliance. The welfare gains of these sophisticated Markov models of enforcement are
due, in part, to the fact that they treat, in equilibrium, firms with low costs differently than
those with high costs. However, all firms are subject to the same pollution control standard. In
our approach, firms with low pollution abatement costs are subjected to different pollution
control standards, as well as different enforcement measures, than firms with high costs.13
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
The Lagrangian for the asymmetric information/enforcement problem is contained in the
text of Section 4 as are the proofs of the preliminary results that the Lagrange multipliers z12,
y1, and l1 are all equal to zero. The first-order necessary conditions are consequently
a1E'(q1) - [a1 + w12]Cq(q1,q 1) + w21Cq(q1,q 2) = 0. (A.1)
a2E'(q2) - [a2 + l2  + y2+w21 + z21]Cq(q2,q 2) + w12[Cq(q2,q 1)] = 0. (A.2)
a1 ( 1 - b ) + w12  - w21 - z21  = 0. (A.3)
a2 ( 1 - b )  + l2 + w21  -  w12  + z21  = 0.  (A.4)
a1c + z21 F1- v1 = 0  (A.5)
             - a2c + y2F2 - u2 = 0. (A.6)
             - x1 + z21p1 = 0. And (A.7)
              - x2  + y2p2 = 0. (A.8)
Since a1c  > 0, a2c  > 0, u1 ³ 0, u2 ³ 0 z21  > 0 and y2 > 0 from (A.5) and (A.6). With q1, q2
e (0,qmax), from assumption (2.1), p1 > 0 and p2 > 0 to satisfy the compliance constraints.
Consequently. z21p1 >0 and y2p2 > 0 so that x1 > 0 and x2 > 0, yielding condition (vii) of the
proposition:F1 = F2 = ). For the interior solution in monitoring probabilities p1 and p2 covered
by this proposition, u1 = 0 and u2 = 0. Therefore z21 =
F
c) ( 1 a  > 0 and y2 = 
F
c) ( 2 a  > 0. The facts
that hybrid incentive compatibility / compliance constraints are binding for a high cost-type
firm generate conditions (v) and (vi) of the proposition.
If w21, > 0 then from (A.3), w12 = a1 (b - 1)  + 
F
c) ( 1 a  > 0, yielding condition (iii) of the
proposition. If w21 = 0, then l2 = a2(b - 1) + a1 (b - 1) +  
F
c) ( 1 a  - 
F
c) ( 1 a  = (b -1 ) > 0 from
equation (A.4), thereby generating condition (iv) of the proposition. Moreover, with
w12 =  a1 (b - 1) + 
F
c) ( 1 a , (A.1) becomes a1E' (q1) = [ a1  + a1 (b - 1) + 
F
c) ( 1 a  ] Cq(q1,q 1).





2 ( ), 1 (
a b l = - =  and z21 = 
F
c) ( 1 a , (A.2) may be rewritten as condition (ii) of the
proposition.
To check that w21 = 0, we check that profits for a firm with q = q2 are larger if it accepts
and complies with the (q2,S2,p2,F2) contract rather than the (q1,S1,p1,F1) contract. Profits for a
high cost-type firm complying with the contract designed for a low cost-type are
p- Cq(q1,q 2) + S1
              = {p - C(q1,q 1) + S1} + C(q1,q 1) - C(q1,q 2)( A . 9 )
              = {p - C(q2,q 1) + S2} + C(q1,q 1) - C(q1,q 2)
where {p - C(q1,q 1) + S1} = {p - C(q2,q 1) + S2} since incentive compatibility is a binding
constraint (w12 > 0) for a low cost-type firm. From (A.9) it is easy to see that profits are
distinctly larger for a high cost-type firm if it complies with the contract designed for its type:
                 (p - C(q2,q 2) + S2) - (p -  C(q1,q 2) +S1)
                  = (p - C(q2,q 2) + S2) - (p -  C(q2,q 1) +S2) -  C(q1,q 1)  + C(q1,q 2) (A.10)
                  = [C(q1,q 2) - C(q1,q 1)] - [C(q2,q 2) - C(q2,q 1)] > 0
given assumption (2.4) and the fact that q1 > q2. Since the incentive compatibility constraint
for a high cost-type firm is not binding w21 = 0, and the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
The Lagrangian for the asymmetric information/enforcement problem is contained in the
text of Section 3 as are the proofs of the preliminary results that the Lagrange multipliers z12,
y1 , and l1  are all equal to zero. The first-order necessary conditions are (A.1) through (A.8)
presented in the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Again, since a1c > 0, a2c > 0, u1 ³ 0, and  u2 ³ 0, we attain z21 > 0 and y2 > 0 from (A.5)
and (A.6). With q1,q2. e (0,qmax), assumption (2.1) states that abatement costs will be positive,
necessitating the result that p1 > 0 and p2 > 0 to satisfy the compliance constraints.
Consequently, z21 p1 > 0 and y2p2 > o so that x1 > 0 and x2 > 0; that is, the maximum penalty
constraints are binding, and condition (vii) of the proposition is obtained: F1 = F2 = ).
For the partial corner solution covered by the proposition, p1 = 1 and u1 > 0 while p2 < 1
and u2 = 0. Therefore, from (A.5) we obtain z21 = 
() au 11 c
F
+




. With z21 > 0 and y2 > 0, the hybrid incentive compatibility/compliance constraints
for a high cost-type firm are binding, generating conditions (iii) and (iv) of the proposition.15
If w21 = 0, then from (A.3), w12  = a1 (b - 1) + 
￿￿ au ￿￿ F
)
+
 > 0, providing condition (v) of the
proposition. If w21 = 0, then from (A.4), l2= (b - 1) > 0, and we obtain condition (vi). If
w21  = 0, (A.1) and (A.2) directly imply conditions (i) and (ii) of the proposition. Finally, the
proof that w21 = 0 is identical to the one found at the end of the proof of Proposition 3.1:
profits are distinctly larger for a high cost-type firm if it complies with the contract designed
for its type rather than with the low cost-type contract.16
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